Economic sovereignty is no longer a concept—it is a frontline. People, finance, law, real estate: industrial espionage has changed scale. Here is why French companies must rethink their reflexes—and quickly.
Industrial espionage is no longer digital; it is human, capital‑driven, physical. And real estate has become the forgotten fault line. A must‑read before your next strategic committee meeting.
◆ SOVEREIGNTY, INTERFERENCE & INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE: FRANCE FACING REALITY
For years, we assumed industrial espionage belonged to novels—dimly lit intrigue, masked heroes, Hollywood endings. Today, that fiction has become a routine feature of the economic landscape. Stone façades, glass floors, quiet offices where contracts are signed: all of these hide vectors of interference, information extraction, and threats to the industrial capability of our companies. Naivety has no place anymore.
The scene is simple and recurring: a door poorly locked, a safe left ajar, a team member approached “to share expertise.” A photograph of a document, a copied dataset—and within weeks, a technology, process, or competitive position is compromised. This is not a strictly technical issue. It is a strategic, cultural, and human one.
◆ THE HUMAN FACTOR: FIRST VULNERABILITY
Before firewalls, certificates, and audits, there is the human being. It is often a matter of misplaced trust: a retiree invited to “share experience,” an intern recruited through an unchecked channel, a supplier contacted by phone. Social engineering is the oldest and most effective weapon. Discipline and routine—two natural enemies of an attack—must again become corporate values. Training, awareness, and a culture of vigilance are the first pragmatic safeguards.
◆ CAPITAL INVESTMENTS TARGETING TECHNOLOGY
If one threat had to be singled out as the most insidious and structurally dangerous, it would be this one. France, a land of innovation and niche industries, attracts capital. Ninety‑nine percent of investors are legitimate. But the remaining 1% is not seeking financial return alone—they seek access to know‑how, algorithms, prototypes, production chains, in short: the intellectual property that underpins French competitiveness.
These operations are rarely brutal. They unfold in acts: discreet reconnaissance, minority stake acquisition, participation in technical committees, controlled exposure to prototypes, and ultimately the extraction of fragments of know‑how. Legal structures are well oiled; ultimate shareholders remain opaque. Sometimes, the investment vehicle is entirely legal and registered in respectable financial centers—making detection difficult. Other times, private equity funds, venture capital vehicles, or industrial holdings act as masks for state or para‑state interests.
The issue is not investment itself—France must remain attractive—but the absence of reflexes. Too many companies lack a vigilance shield: enhanced due diligence, protective contractual clauses, oversight of technology use, reinforced governance when a strategic investor enters the capital. SMEs and mid‑sized firms—often embedded in sensitive value chains—are particularly exposed: they often lack the resources for legal and technical teams capable of detecting sophisticated structures.
Practically, companies must:
– Map strategic assets (patents, prototypes, know‑how, critical suppliers).
– Treat the entry of an investor as a security process: reinforced due diligence, supply‑chain audit, commitment on industrial continuity.
– Implement technical (encryption keys, segmented access) and contractual safeguards (non‑transfer clauses, control over share disposals).
– Involve the State when the issue goes beyond commercial scope: notifications to competent authorities, use of foreign‑investment screening mechanisms.
Failing to act is turning a potential ally into a Trojan horse. The issue is simple: protecting the technological sovereignty levers structuring the French economy.
◆ REPUTATIONAL OFFENSIVES
Reputation has become a weapon. Targeted campaigns—sometimes initiated in good faith—may be hijacked. At a critical time—RFP, due diligence, executive appointment—a media or digital campaign can derail an operation. Reputation resilience must therefore be built into crisis‑management frameworks: mapping narrative vulnerabilities, rapid‑response plans, tracing the financing of hostile campaigns.
◆ CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES
The Covid experience proved that supply chains are geostrategic vulnerabilities. Semiconductors, titanium, essential industrial components—if one link fails, the whole system falters. Relocalizing when possible, diversifying when not, and above all mapping risks is essential. A “competitive” supplier may turn out to be a data vacuum and an entry point for interference.
◆ LAW AS A WEAPON
Extraterritorial regimes, customs pressure, weaponized legal proceedings: law is now a strategic instrument. Entrusting data to a provider subject to foreign legislation, without effective safeguards, is relinquishing control of one’s information. This new reality demands greater rigor in partner selection and protective contractual clauses.
◆ REAL ESTATE: THE NEW ATTACK SURFACE
Buildings are no longer mere workspaces: they host data, networks, technical‑management systems, secondary data centers. BMS/GTC systems, badge access, technical rooms, maintenance providers, connected meeting rooms—all of these are exposure zones. Real estate has become a pivot of operational sovereignty.
The role of the real‑estate director is evolving: they must map information flows, control physical and digital access, audit service providers, and segment infrastructures. Securing premises means securing a strategic asset.
◆ TOWARD A SOVEREIGNTY CULTURE
This is not paranoia but pragmatism. Sovereignty is built through routines: audits, training, governance, proportionate sanctions. It requires real cooperation between companies and the State, alert protocols, and coordinated responses at national and European levels.
France has strengths—institutions, services, doctrine—but the speed of threats requires acceleration. The question is no longer technical alone: it is industrial strategy and economic civilization.
◆ ◆ CONCLUSION ◆ ◆
Sovereignty is not a speech; it is an operational discipline. The companies that survive will be those that anticipate.
The time for carelessness is over. Every company must ask itself: What are my critical assets? Who has access to what? How do I track and protect ?
If the answer is unclear, then it is time to act—NOW.
